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Abstract: This study employed hierarchical piecewise growth modeling and two interrupted 
time series models to examine the effect of introducing an Advanced Placement (AP) school 
accountability incentive on AP access in Pennsylvania. Specifically, we examined whether 
adoption of an advanced course access accountability indicator was associated with an increase 
in AP course offerings initially and in the three years after the policy intervention. We also 
analyzed if the indicator differentially affected schools we hypothesized as sensitive or 
nonsensitive to the policy and examined demographic differences between those school 
groups. Pennsylvania’s AP accountability incentive was associated with an initial increase in 
schools’ AP course offerings, but the trajectory of change during the post-policy intervention 
period did not differ from the pre-policy baseline period. Also, the sizeable gap between 
schools with the most and fewest AP course offerings did not narrow across time. Instead, the 
gap widened. Our results suggest that adoption of AP school accountability incentives may not 
be a long-term solution to improving AP access for all schools or narrowing disparities in 
epaa aape
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access between schools. We call for examinations in other states to determine if, and under 
what conditions, AP accountability incentives increase AP course offerings while narrowing 
access disparities. 
Keywords: school accountability; Advanced Placement; educational equity; interrupted time 
series 
 
La influencia de los incentivos de rendición de cuentas en las escuelas en el acceso a 
cursos de Advanced Placement: Evidencia de Pennsylvania 
Resumen: Este estudio empleó modelos de crecimiento y dos modelos de series de tiempo 
interrumpido para examinar el efecto de introducir un incentivo de rendición de cuentas 
escolar de Advanced Placement (AP) en el acceso a AP en Pensilvania. Específicamente, 
examinamos si la adopción de un indicador avanzado de rendición de cuentas de acceso al 
curso se asoció con un aumento en la oferta de cursos AP inicialmente y en los tres años 
posteriores a la intervención de la política. También analizamos si el indicador afectó de 
manera diferencial a las escuelas que planteamos como sensibles o no sensibles a la política y 
examinamos las diferencias demográficas entre esos grupos escolares. El incentivo de 
responsabilidad AP de Pensilvania se asoció con un aumento inicial en la oferta de cursos AP 
de las escuelas pero la trayectoria del cambio desde el período anterior a la política y la 
intervención posterior a la política. Además, la brecha considerable entre las escuelas con la 
mayoría y la menor cantidad de ofertas de cursos AP se amplió con el tiempo. Nuestros 
resultados sugieren que la adopción de incentivos de rendición de cuentas escolar AP puede 
no ser una solución a largo plazo para mejorar el acceso AP para todas las escuelas o reducir 
las disparidades en el acceso entre las escuelas. Solicitamos exámenes en otros estados para 
determinar si y como estos incentivos aumentan las ofertas de cursos AP y reducen las 
disparidades de acceso. 
Palabras-clave: rendición de cuentas; Advanced Placement; equidad educativa; series de 
tiempo interrumpidas 
 
A influência dos incentivos de prestação de contas nas escolas no acesso à Advanced 
Placement: Evidências da Pensilvânia 
Resumo: Este estudo empregou modelagem hierárquica de crescimento e modelos de séries 
temporais interrompidas para examinar o efeito da introdução de um incentivo de prestação 
de contas escolar de Advanced Placement (AP) no acesso ao AP na Pensilvânia. 
Especificamente, examinamos se a adoção de um indicador avançado de prestação de contas 
de acesso a cursos estava associada a um aumento nas ofertas de cursos de AP inicialmente e 
nos três anos após a intervenção política. Também analisamos se o indicador afetou 
diferencialmente as escolas que, segundo nossa hipótese, eram sensíveis ou não sensíveis à 
política e examinamos as diferenças demográficas entre esses grupos escolares. O incentivo de 
prestação de contas de AP da Pensilvânia foi associado a um aumento inicial nas ofertas de 
cursos de AP das escolas, mas a trajetória de mudança durante o período de intervenção pós-
política não diferiu do período de linha de base pré-política. Além disso, a diferença 
considerável entre as escolas com o menor número de ofertas de cursos de AP aumentou. 
Nossos resultados sugerem que a adoção de incentivos à prestação de contas nas escolas de 
AP pode não ser uma solução de longo prazo para melhorar o acesso ao PA em todas as 
escolas ou diminuir as disparidades no acesso entre as escolas. Solicitamos exames em outros 
estados para determinar se e como esses incentivos aumentam as ofertas de cursos da AP e 
reduzem as disparidades de acesso. 
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The Influence of School Accountability Incentives on Advanced Placement 
Access: Evidence from Pennsylvania 
 
The Advanced Placement (AP) program, administered by the College Board, has garnered 
significant federal resources and considerable attention in state policy. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Education distributed $273 million in grants via the AP Incentive Program from 
2002 to 2011 to increase AP access for students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2013). The Federal government is not alone in its attempts to 
improve AP access and performance. According to the Education Commission of the States (2016), 
every state except Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, and Vermont employed at least one AP policy, 
including 32 states that used AP participation or performance as high school accountability 
indicators. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of school accountability incentives on 
AP access in Pennsylvania, the only state to our knowledge that has employed an accountability 
indicator designed to increase school-level AP course offerings.  
The wide-scale use of AP indicators in school accountability stems in large part from the 
belief that AP accountability incentives will cause schools to provide greater access to the range of 
benefits associated with AP participation (Achieve & Jobs for the Future, 2015; The Education 
Trust, 2019), including the program’s potential for providing students with academic, economic, and 
social advantages. When academic outcomes have been investigated, researchers affiliated with the 
College Board, as well as those working independently, have “generally found that AP participation 
is associated with higher academic achievement” (Warne, 2017, p. 4). The College Board (2014) 
attributes the academic benefits to the college-level knowledge and skills proffered through 
participation in one or more of its 38 courses and associated exams.1 AP participation also positions 
students to receive economic benefits, such as gaining college credit for scoring high enough on AP 
exams, reducing time and expense en route to college graduation (Ackerman, Kanfer, & 
Calderwood, 2013). A less discussed but equally important advantage of AP is the mark of 
distinction conferred on students and schools (Klugman, 2013). Students, especially those seeking 
admission to selective universities, can leverage their AP participation as an indicator of college 
readiness on their high school transcripts (Geiser & Santelices, 2004; Sadler, 2010). Relatedly, many 
school leaders seek to bolster their AP course offerings and exam performance to gain a competitive 
edge over other schools (Klugman, 2013). Competition among schools is facilitated partly by 
ranking systems such as the U.S. News and World Report Best High School Rankings, where AP 
participation and performance indicators account for 40% of the composite score for more than 
17,000 high schools (Morse & Brooks, 2019).  
Advocates for the inclusion of AP indicators in school accountability also argue access to 
advanced courses that include the possibility of earning college credit “matters to students and 
parents” (Achieve & Jobs for the Future, 2015, p. 2; The Education Trust, 2019, p. 2). The steady 
increase in school-level AP access and exam participation across time supports the notion that 
parents and students demand greater AP access. Between academic years 1996-97 and 2015-16, the 
 
1 Participation means enrolling and completing an Advanced Placement (AP) course. Performance means 
students’ scores on AP exams. 
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percentage of U.S. public high schools2 administering at least one AP exam increased from 55% to 
73% (College Board, 1997; 2016). In 2016-17 alone, more than 2.3 million—or 16% of U.S. public 
high school students3—sat for 4.2 million AP exams (College Board, 2017), though the number of 
students participating in AP is likely higher because some students elect not to sit for AP’s end-of-
course exams. AP access, however, is not equal across schools. AP access is conditioned on several 
school-level characteristics, including socioeconomic status, racial/ethnic composition, enrollment, 
student-teacher ratio, and geographic locale (Thier, Beach, Todd, & Coleman, 2016). The few 
studies to examine growth in AP access have found schools that serve higher proportions of 
students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds and/or students of color increase AP 
course offerings at slower rates than schools with student bodies of higher socioeconomic status 
and/or less diversity (Klopfenstein, 2004; Klugman, 2013; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). These 
inequalities are especially problematic considering the AP program has been repositioned to 
simultaneously improve college access and better prepare students for postsecondary success.  
In light of ongoing federal and state investments, continued growth in AP participation, and 
persistent equity challenges, this study examined if Pennsylvania’s accountability reform led to 
improved AP access. Pennsylvania reformed its school accountability system in 2013 after having its 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act flexibility waiver approved by the U.S. Department of 
Education. Pennsylvania’s new accountability system included a range of new indicators, including 
one that awarded schools points based on the number of advanced courses offered, such as AP. To 
our knowledge, Pennsylvania is the only state that has employed an accountability indicator 
specifically designed to improve AP access as states typically adopt AP indicators that focus on exam 
performance (Conley, Thier, Beach, Lench, & Chadwick, 2014). Additionally, the design of 
Pennsylvania’s AP access indicator appeared to target schools with the fewest advanced course 
offerings. This study was thus designed to ascertain if including an AP access indicator in 
Pennsylvania’s school accountability system was associated with an increase in the number of AP 
courses offered across schools initially and during a three-year policy intervention period, with a 
specific focus on schools with the fewest course offerings. 
Previous Research 
Several authors have examined AP access, including what student and school demographic 
variables predict access as well as what within-school barriers prevent access for students (e.g., 
Conger, Long, & Iatarola, 2009; Klopfenstein, 2004; Thier et al., 2016). Although these authors and 
others have put forth different theories for explaining why disparities in AP access exist between 
and within schools, it is indisputable that certain schools and students are more likely than others to 
have exposure to the potential benefits AP can provide (Kolluri, 2018). State policymakers have 
instituted numerous AP-specific policies to address these disparities, and/or in some cases, state AP 
accountability policy has been enacted to simply expand opportunities for students to access AP’s 
potential benefits (Education Commission of the States, 2006; 2016). Yet, only a handful of studies 
have specifically examined the effects of state AP policies. The current study adds to the literature by 
 
2 We obtained school-level codes from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Elementary/Secondary 
Common Core of Data, which we used to determine the number of public high schools in academic years 
1996-97 through 2015-16 that administered at least one AP exam. We excluded schools coded as other because 
some of these schools may not offer the high school grades in which students typically enroll in AP courses. 
3 The percentage of public school students that sat for at least one AP exam in 2016-17 is based on the 
number of public high school students in 2015-16, which was approximately 14 million according to the 
National Center for Education Statistics’ Elementary/Secondary Common Core of Data. 
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using quasi-experimental methods to quantitatively investigate the effects of a state-level AP policy 
change. We begin with a review of past research on AP at the school level, as well as studies 
examining policy interventions designed to improve AP access and performance. We then describe 
how economic theory can help explain the design and intended effect of school accountability 
incentives before describing Pennsylvania’s recent reforms.  
School-Level Advanced Placement Access 
 AP originated in the 1950s as a program designed to provide elite high school students with 
access to college-level curriculum (Lacy, 2010). The AP program was accessed primarily by high-
achieving students until the 1980s and 1990s when Schneider (2009) argues the general popularity of 
the program, state policy support, and several initiatives that provided subsidies for AP exam fees 
led to substantial increases in access for all students. AP access continued to expand for all students 
during the next two decades. For example, data from two nationally representative samples shows 
the percentage of students who received AP credit on their high school transcripts more than 
doubled for Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White students from 1990 to 2013 (Malkus, 2015). 
However, the gap in AP participation between these groups remained steady across time, with Asian 
students (70% in 2013) the most likely to earn AP credit, followed by White (41%), Hispanic (37%), 
and Black (27%) students. The College Board (2018) has addressed these equity concerns by 
encouraging the expansion of AP access through the “elimination of barriers that restrict access to 
AP for students from ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups that have been traditionally 
underrepresented” (p. 9). However, disparities in access based on race/ethnicity and socioeconomic 
status persist despite the steady growth in AP access for all students (Kolluri, 2018).  
Several researchers have found AP access to associate negatively with schools’ percentage of 
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch (Barnard-Brak, McGaha-Garnett, & Burley, 2011; 
Iatarola, Conger, & Long, 2011; Klopfenstein, 2004; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). There also seems to 
be some agreement across studies that schools with a high proportion of White students have more 
AP access (Barnard-Brak et al., 2011; Cisneros, Gomez, Powers, Holloway-Libell, & Corley, 2014; 
Iatarola et al., 2011) than schools with a high proportion of Black, Latinx, or American 
Indian/Alaska Native students (Conger et al., 2009; Darity, Castellino, Tyson, Cobb, & McMillen, 
2001; Klugman, 2013), although authors vary in how they categorize student groups. With respect to 
school size, the number of students enrolled has a positive relationship with AP access (Cisneros et 
al., 2014; Iatarola et al., 2011; Jeong, 2009; Malkus, 2016; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). The few studies 
that have examined relations between AP access and schools’ student-teacher ratios produced 
negative (Iatarola et al., 2011) or inconclusive associations (Conger et al., 2009). Finally, regarding 
geographic locale, schools in suburban areas, on average, appear to have more AP access than 
schools in cities, towns, or rural areas (Gagnon & Mattingly, 2016; Jeong, 2009; Klopfenstein, 2004; 
Klugman, 2013; Zarate & Pachon, 2006).  
Advanced Placement Policy Analyses 
A relatively small group of researchers have examined state policies designed to improve AP 
access and performance. For example, Jeong (2009) used the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 
to analyze two types of state policies: AP exam fee waivers and merit-based incentives (e.g., 
scholarships for students, cash for teachers) tied to AP exam scores. Jeong found students in the 
nine states that waived exam fees were more likely to take AP exams than peers in other states, but 
students in the five states with merit-based policies were not more likely to take AP exams. A 
separate study in Texas found that subsidies for AP exam fees “provided no incentive for schools to 
expand their AP course offerings” and that high-poverty and rural schools continued to offer far 
less AP access than other schools (Klopfenstein, 2004, p. 10).  
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Jackson (2010) analyzed how the Texas AP Incentive Program affected five outcomes, 
including AP course participation and performance, SAT/ACT participation and performance, and 
college matriculation. Texas’ program provided cash incentives to teachers and students for passing 
AP exam scores (i.e., typically 3 or higher on a 1-5 scale). Using a differences-in-differences 
approach, Jackson compared schools that would eventually adopt the program and those that never 
did, attributing to the AP Incentive Program improvements in all outcomes but SAT/ACT 
performance. Similarly, Kramer (2016) analyzed whether state merit-based incentives led to increases 
in AP course participation and exam-taking. During calendar years 1993-2005, 14 states instituted 
policies that paid for all or some of a student’s college tuition based on high school grade-point 
average. States where grade-point average included weighted bonuses for AP course-taking saw 
higher increases in course and exam participation than states that did not add weight for AP courses.  
 Of the studies examining the effects of AP policy, Klugman (2013) was alone in finding that 
school-level inequalities in AP access persisted, and in some cases accelerated, despite a “short lived” 
intensive investment aimed in part at equalizing AP access across schools (p. 4). Klugman explored 
whether three California policies designed to improve AP access narrowed inequalities associated 
with school-level socioeconomic status and racial/ethnic composition. Those policies included AP 
Challenge Grants (e.g., funding for teacher training, instructional materials, and tutoring services), 
funding for AP-specific training and support in the Advancement Via Individual Determination 
program, and a University of California initiative aimed at increasing online AP course offerings. 
Klugman used 3-level hierarchical linear models to analyze 10 years of data, finding evidence that 
California’s intervention increased AP course offerings and course participation, but “did very little 
to decrease inequalities” (p. 26). Schools predominately serving students who were Asian or White 
saw larger increases in AP course offerings and participation than those predominately serving 
students who were Black or Latinx. 
Using a resource deprivation framework and the theory of Effectively Maintained 
Inequalities, Klugman (2013) explained why California’s multi-pronged policy approach failed to 
close gaps in AP access. First, Klugman argues that scholars’ typical explanations when examining 
school-level AP access inequalities focus on the resource constraints facing families and schools that 
serve high percentages of students traditionally marginalized in public education based on 
socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity. Resource constraints can be material (e.g., teachers with 
advanced degrees) or immaterial (e.g., social and cultural capital) in nature (Klugman, 2013; Iatarola 
et al., 2011). Under the resource deprivation framework, interventions targeting constraints that 
schools, families, and students face should help reduce inequalities in school-level AP access, thus 
improving opportunities to learn advanced coursework.  
 The theory of Effectively Maintained Inequalities (Lucas, 2001) posits that students from 
high socioeconomic families, who are increasingly concentrated in high socioeconomic school 
contexts (Owens, Reardon, & Jencks, 2016), will demand more AP courses to gain a competitive 
edge in admissions offices at elite colleges and universities. Klugman (2013) follows by arguing that 
schools will continually increase AP course offerings to match demands from high socioeconomic 
families to produce more opportunities for their children as they pursue marks of distinction for 
college admissions. Despite California’s effort to provide resources to improve access for schools 
with the fewest AP course offerings, schools with already high levels of AP access kept pace or 
increased course offerings relative to other schools, thus maintaining advantages.  
 As the Education Commission of the States (2016) shows, states also employ AP policies 
that do not provide direct resources to schools or students, such as school accountability incentives. 
For example, Rowland and Shircliffe (2016) examined one school’s reaction to the Florida 
Partnership for Minority and Underrepresented Student Achievement Act of 2007 and the state’s 
decision to use AP participation and exam performance data to rank schools in its accountability 
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system in 2009. The resource-focused Florida Partnership for Minority and Underrepresented 
Student Achievement Act provided professional development to teachers in the core content areas 
and assisted school districts on identifying minority and underrepresented students for potential 
participation in AP. Interviews with teachers, district leaders, and elected officials revealed tensions 
between simultaneous efforts to expand AP access as part of the Florida Partnership for Minority 
and Underrepresented Student Achievement Act and improve AP exam performance in the state’s 
school accountability system. The authors found that Florida’s accountability system complicated 
“teachers’ views of AP expansion, particularly in relation to the use of pass rates to evaluate AP 
instruction” and in the calculation of school accountability ratings (p. 415). Because expanding AP 
access might yield lower AP exam scores—absent educational inputs that concurrently focus on 
equity and excellence—some states’ approaches to school accountability can disincentivize school 
staff from recruiting more students for AP courses. The same approach of restricting AP access to 
only high performers would reward schools with better accountability ratings. Below, we describe 
how economic theory can help explain why schools, such as the one in Rowland and Shircliffe’s 
study, may be sensitive to school accountability incentives that aim to improve AP access.  
Principal Agent Theory and School Accountability  
Economists developed principal-agent theory to help explain contractual relations between 
managers and employees in the business world (Holmstrom & Costa, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). Not long after it was conceived, scholars began modifying 
principal-agent theory to better conceptualize relational and contractual dynamics between different 
actors in the public sector (Moe, 1984), including education (e.g., Bae, 2018; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; 
Moe, 2003; Polikoff, McEachin, Wrabel, & Duque, 2014). As Bae (2018) describes, in the basic 
model, “educators (agents) might not act in accordance with the interests of stakeholders (e.g., 
parents, community members, and policymakers – the principal) unless motivated to do so with 
incentives (both positive and negative) created through accountability systems” (p. 4). Scholars vary 
in who they think are sensitive to these incentives, but at the most basic level it appears school 
accountability policy is designed to motivate teachers and administrators to improve their 
educational practices in accordance with the goals set by policymakers (Figlio & Loeb, 2011). 
Moreover, “school-based accountability operates on the notion that incentives and public pressure 
from publicly reported information will result in improved student outcomes” (Bae, 2018, p. 5).  
 Under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, federal policymakers set the goal of universal 
proficiency in numeracy and literacy and required states to publicly report school-level standardized 
test scores in mathematics and reading as a high-stakes accountability incentive. No Child Left 
Behind was heavily critiqued for focusing too narrowly on numeracy and literacy proficiency at the 
expense of other outcomes that stakeholders also value, such as civic engagement, the Arts, and 
social skills (e.g., Rothstein, Jacobsen, & Wilder, 2008). Part of this critique can be explained by 
principal-agent theory, which predicts policies will have unintended consequences when agents (i.e., 
educators) are required to multi-task on the job and pursue multiple goals, but are only held 
accountable by principals (i.e., policymakers) to a narrow set of outcomes (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1991). In these cases, agents will react by focusing a disproportionate amount of energy on 
improving the outcome(s) they are held accountable to while paying less attention to other priorities. 
Indeed, research shows schools largely responded to high-stakes school accountability policy by 
focusing disproportionately on the tested subjects used for accountability purposes, also referred to 
as curriculum narrowing (Berliner, 2011).  
 Perhaps the most common policy recommendation stemming from the unintended 
consequence of curriculum narrowing was to expand the type and number of educational indicators 
used to hold schools accountable. For example, Darling-Hammond, Wilhoit, and Pittenger (2014) 
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argue ideal state accountability systems should provide adequate resources to schools, invest in 
building the capacity of teachers and administrators, and create a data dashboard that includes 
multiple indicators of school performance to “provide a better accounting of what schools are doing 
and with what results” (p. 27). Darling-Hammond et al. go on to argue these types of multiple 
indicator systems existed in several states during the 1990s, went relatively dormant during the 2000s 
due to No Child Left Behind requirements, and eventually made a comeback through the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) flexibility waiver process.  
 ESEA waivers allowed state policymakers the opportunity to request flexibility on certain 
No Child Left Behind requirements, including the indicators used to hold schools accountable. 
Several states seized the opportunity provided by ESEA waivers to expand the type and number of 
indicators used to assign school quality ratings and identify schools in need of improvement. For 
example, Polikoff et al. (2014) analyzed 42 approved ESEA waivers and found that 38 states created 
some sort of composite index that employed multiple indicators to assign school quality ratings. 
Pennsylvania, one of these 38 states, used the ESEA waiver process to create a composite index that 
employed 23 indicators to generate school quality ratings for high schools.  
Pennsylvania’s Accountability System Redesign 
Pennsylvania policymakers first presented plans to redesign the state’s school accountability 
system in February 2013 upon submitting its initial ESEA flexibility waiver to the U.S. Department 
of Education. Under its flexibility waiver, Pennsylvania created the School Performance Profile. For high 
schools, the School Performance Profile included 23 indicators across five categories: academic 
achievement, closing achievement gaps, academic growth, other academic indicators, and extra-
credit indicators. Approved state flexibility waivers, including Pennsylvania’s, expired after 2017-18 
when the Every Student Succeeds Act took effect. As a result, Pennsylvania schools have five years 
(2012-13 to 2017-18) of “Building Level Academic Score” data in the School Performance Profile.  
The Building Level Academic Scores for high schools relied on data from 18 of the 23 
accountability indicators to generate a score on a 100-point scale (schools could earn extra credit 
accountability points from the five remaining indicators). One of these 18 indicators measured 
schools’ college credit-bearing course offerings (e.g., AP, International Baccalaureate) in four core 
academic areas: mathematics, English language arts, life and physical sciences, social studies and 
history. This indicator, which we refer to as “Access to Advanced Coursework” (AAC), accounted 
for 2.50% of schools’ Building Level Academic Scores. This study specifically analyzes the effect of 
introducing the AAC indicator into Pennsylvania’s accountability system on school-level AP access.  
An important feature of the AAC indicator was that schools earned maximum accountability 
points when they had at least one student enroll in an advanced course in each of the four core 
academic areas (e.g., AP Statistics, AP English Literature and Composition, AP U.S. History, and a 
dual-enrollment course in chemistry). Once schools reached the maximum AAC points there was no 
accountability point incentive for offering more advanced courses. We refer to these schools as policy 
nonsensitive because they had already earned maximum accountability points when the new 
accountability system took effect, and the other schools as policy sensitive because they had not yet 
received maximum points. Stated differently, policy sensitive schools had more of an accountability 
incentive to increase AP course offerings because they could earn more accountability points from 
doing so whereas policy nonsensitive schools could not.  
Principal-agent theory predicts publicly reporting school performance data will motivate 
educators to improve on the outcomes being measured. Thus, we designed our study to examine if 
introduction of Pennsylvania’s AP accountability incentive increased the average number of AP 
courses offered initially and across time. Of particular interest was ascertaining whether changes in 
Pennsylvania’s school accountability system led to relatively more AP course offerings in policy 
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sensitive schools, thereby narrowing AP access disparities between policy sensitive and nonsensitive 
schools. Note, however, the primary intent of the current investigation was to determine if inclusion 
of the AAC indicator had the intended effect of increasing AP courses offerings. As such, we 
employed school demographics as statistical controls in our analytical models to ensure any changes 
we observed in AP course offerings was not confounded by changes in school characteristics.  
Method 
The present study examined whether the introduction of the AAC indicator in 
Pennsylvania’s school accountability system was associated with changes in school-level AP course 
offerings. We employed hierarchical piecewise growth modeling and two interrupted time series 
(ITS) models, simple and comparative (CITS), to examine whether the AAC indicator led to an 
average increase in AP access initially and during a three year policy intervention period 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Singer & Willet, 2003). We also 
analyzed if policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools had different trajectories in AP course offerings 
prior to adoption of the AAC indicator, if adoption of the AAC indicator differentially affected the 
two groups, and if the two groups differed with respect to five school demographic characteristics. 
Data 
We utilized three data sources in this study: the Pennsylvania School Performance Profile website 
data files, the National Center for Education Statistics’ Elementary/Secondary Common Core of 
Data, and the AP Course Audit database. In the Pennsylvania School Performance Profile, 638 schools 
have data for the AAC indicator for five years: one year before the accountability policy change 
(2012-13) and the four years after (i.e., until 2016-17). We matched schools from the Pennsylvania 
School Performance Profile with those in the Common Core of Data based on school names, cities, and 
addresses, failing to match only one school. We excluded 82 schools in the Common Core of Data 
coded as vocational (n = 18), alterative (n = 1), or other (i.e., not high schools; n = 63). For each 
school under analysis, we obtained the following variables from the Common Core of Data: 
proportion of students eligible for free or reduced priced lunch (variable label, poverty), proportion of 
students who are White (White), total number of enrolled students (enroll), student-teacher ratio 
(ratio), and geographical locale (categorized as city, suburb, fringe, distant, and remote). Finally, we merged 
our working version of those datasets with the AP Course Audit database using school names, cities, 
and addresses. The AP Course Audit database, administered by Inflexion (formerly the Educational 
Policy Improvement Center), includes the number and type of AP courses offered in all schools 
starting from 2007-08. In all, we retained an analytical sample of n = 555 high schools that received 
AAC ratings in Pennsylvania’s accountability system. Our analytical sample includes 99.82% of the 
traditional high schools theoretically affected by Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator.  
Research Design 
We used 2-level hierarchical piecewise growth models with time nested in schools to analyze 
the AAC indicator’s effect on school-level AP course offerings initially (i.e., changes in intercept) 
and during a three year policy intervention period (i.e., changes in slope). Hierarchical piecewise 
growth modeling allowed us to estimate two growth functions, one for the pre-policy intervention 
period (2007-08 to 2013-14) and one for the post-policy intervention period (2014-15 to 2016-17). 
We did not develop a 3-level model because of limited variability within districts: 94.67% of the 
districts in our sample contained a single high school. 
As discussed briefly above, the design of the AAC indicator created two distinct groups of 
schools, policy sensitive and nonsensitive. The AAC indicator operated on a five-level scale (0, 25, 
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50, 75, 100), and schools could earn no additional accountability points once they reached the 
mathematical maximum of 100 AAC points. Policy sensitive schools did not earn all 100 points on 
the AAC indicator in 2012-13, the second to last pre-policy intervention year. Policy nonsensitive 
schools earned all 100 AAC points in 2012-13, so they could not earn more accountability points by 
subsequently increasing AP course offerings. The comparative aspect of the time series design 
examined whether policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools exhibited a differential response after 
Pennsylvania introduced the AAC accountability indicator.  
Measures 
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for all the variables in our study. We left all 
variables uncentered as each had a true zero. For continuous variables, we report means, standard 
deviations, ranges, and skewness, along with proportions for all five geographic local subcategories. 
The single missing data point in the dataset came from the student-teacher ratio variable; we 
dropped this school from the independent sample t-tests that analyzed whether policy sensitive and 
nonsensitive schools differed with respect to student-teacher ratio.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and School Demographic Variables (n = 555) 
Continuous  M SD Range Skew 
AP coursesa 7.78 6.73 0-29 0.82 
Povertyb 0.39 0.22 0-1 0.98 
Whiteb 0.78 0.28 0-1 -1.70 
Enrollmentb 868.21 558.78 92-3638 1.54 
Ratiob 14.68 2.96 7-37 2.09 
Categorical %    
Cityb 14.6    
Suburbb 41.1    
Fringeb 20.5    
Distantb 19.6    
Remoteb 4.1    
Note. a Dependent variable: data aggregated from academic years 2007-08 to 2016-17; b School 
demographic variables: data only from academic year 2013-14; Poverty = a school’s aggregated percentage 
of students eligible for free or reduced priced lunch; White = White students’ proportion of a school’s 
enrollment; Enrollment = the number of students reported by a school; Ratio = a school’s enrollment 
divided by its number of full-time equivalent classroom teachers.  
  
Dependent, growth, intervention, and treatment group variables. Our dependent 
variable for all analyses was the number of AP courses (e.g., AP Biology, AP Spanish) the College 
Board authorized a school to offer in a given academic year. The range for AP courses across the high 
schools in our sample was from 0 to 29 courses. We chose to use AP course offerings as our 
dependent variable instead of AAC points for two reasons. First, AP course offerings allowed us to 
examine the complete range of AP access across all schools. The AAC indicator has an artificial 
ceiling, making it difficult to determine how advanced course access changed in policy nonsensitive 
schools before or after the policy intervention. Second, we used 10 years of AP Course Audit data to 
estimate two AP access growth functions, one prior to and one after the policy intervention. 
Conversely, the lack of pre-intervention AAC indicator data made it impossible to calculate pre-
policy intervention growth trajectories.  
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We created time, intervention, and treatment group variables for the hierarchical piecewise 
growth models. We analyzed growth in school-level AP access using a linear term, referred to as Pre 
TxSlope, signifying the pre-policy slope. We coded Pre TxSlope as 0 in academic year 2007-08 (i.e., 
the intercept), 1 for 2008-09, 2 for 2009-10, and so on. We employed the variable TxLevel to 
examine intercept changes in AP courses at the point of policy intervention and Post TxSlope to 
examine slope changes in AP courses during the post-policy intervention timeframe. TxLevel was 
coded as 0 prior to the policy intervention (academic year 2013-14), and 1 afterward. Post TxSlope 
was coded as 0 through the first year of the policy intervention (2014-15), 1 for the second year 
(2015-16), and 2 for the third year (2016-17). We considered 2014-15 the first policy intervention 
year because Pennsylvania released the first round of school quality ratings in the beginning of the 
2013-14 academic year using data from 2012-13. We chose not to use 2013-14 as the first policy 
intervention year because as Klugman (2013) argues, district and school administrators make 
decisions on what AP courses to offer the year prior to when they are offered. Finally, TxGroup is a 
dichotomous variable used to classify schools into policy sensitive and nonsensitive groups.  
School demographic variables. We used school-level variables for two purposes. First, we 
used four continuous and one categorical variable to examine demographic differences between 
policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools. We treated all variables in this first analysis as time-static 
using data from 2013-14, the last pre-policy intervention year. This approach helps contextualize the 
general demographic makeup of policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools in the academic year 
before the policy intervention was enacted. Second, we added the four continuous variables as time-
varying covariates in our hierarchical piecewise growth model. 
The four continuous variables used in both analyses include: poverty, White, enroll, and 
ratio. Poverty is the aggregated percentage of students within a school eligible for free or reduced 
priced lunch. Schools’ racial/ethnic composition was expressed by computing the number of White 
students as a proportion of school enrollment. Enrollment is simply the total number of students 
reported by each school. Our last continuous variable was student-teacher ratio: enrollment divided 
by the number of full-time equivalent classroom teachers. Poverty and racial/ethnic composition are 
frequently used variables in examinations of educational equity. Enrollment and student-teacher 
ratio are useful variables because they approximate schools’ contextual needs for breadth of AP 
course offerings as well as schools’ resources to meet such needs (see Thier et al., 2016). 
We used the lone categorical variable, geographic locale, to examine differences in where 
policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools are situated relative to urban areas. To incorporate 
geographical locale, we modified the National Center for Education Statistics’ Urban-Centric Locale 
Codes to create five dummy-coded variables: city, suburb, fringe, distant, and remote. The Urban-
centric codes feature four broad categories: city, suburb, town, and rural, but this approach masks 
important nuances between distant, fringe, and remote subcategories of towns and rural areas 
(Thier, Beach, Martinez, & Hollenbeck, 2017). Analyses that include only city, suburb, and rural 
designations might also fail to detect certain locales that differentiate sites of advantage from sites of 
disadvantage. Therefore, we combined the three subcategories each for city and suburb. Then, we 
recategorized the three town or rural sublevels into fringe (combining town and rural fringe locales), 
distant (town and rural distant locales), and remote (town and rural remote locales)—to prioritize 
urban proximity over the quartiles’ somewhat arbitrary community population counts.  
Analyses 
First, we used independent sample t-tests and chi-square analyses to examine demographic 
differences between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools. We used independent sample t-tests 
to determine if there were statistical differences between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools 
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on the dependent variable (AP courses) and the four continuous school characteristics (poverty, 
White, enroll, and ratio). Due to the nature of the geographic local variable, we used chi-square 
analyses to examine differences between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools regarding the five 
geographical locale categories (city, suburb, fringe, distant, and remote). For both sets of analyses, 
we set α = .05 and used Bonferroni’s procedure to control for familywise Type I error.  
Second, we examined whether the introduction of Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator resulted in 
statistically significant changes in school-level AP course offerings initially (i.e., change in intercept 
from pre- to post-policy intervention year) and during the three years of policy intervention (i.e., 
change in slope from pre- to post-policy intervention years) through application of hierarchical 
piecewise growth modeling. Our analyses also allowed us to determine how policy sensitive and 
nonsensitive schools differed with respect to the initial level of AP course offerings (i.e., intercept) 
and changes across time (i.e., pre-intervention growth trajectory). We employed a four-step model-
building process to determine whether Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator led to statistically significant 
increases in AP course offerings on average for all schools and differentially for policy sensitive 
schools. The first and second steps in our model-building process evaluated whether sufficient 
between-school variation existed to warrant use of hierarchical linear modeling and whether growth 
in school-level AP course offerings should be modeled linearly. Our model-building process 
confirmed that hierarchical linear modeling was appropriate for our dataset (i.e., intraclass 
correlation coefficient of 0.90) and that AP course offerings should be modeled linearly (i.e., 
quadratic and cubic growth terms were not statistically significant, p > .05). 
Next, the simple ITS model (see Equation 1) included the outcome variable, the number of 
AP courses offered, and terms used to estimate the piecewise growth trajectory: Pre TxSlope, 
TxLevel, and Post TxSlope. The simple ITS model provided initial evidence of whether 
Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator affected average AP course offerings across all schools.  
 
 (AP Courses)ti = π0i + π1i (Pre TxSlope)ti + π2i (TxLevel)ti + π3i(Post TxSlope)ti + eti 
π0i = β00 + r0i  
π1i = β10 + r1i 
π2i = β20 + r2i  
π3i = β30 + r3i (1) 
  
In the CITS model (see Equation 2), we estimated cross-level interactions by adding the dummy-
coded treatment group variable (policy sensitive and nonsensitive) to the model. The CITS model 
allowed us to examine if schools reacted differentially to adoption of the AAC indicator based on 
their group classification.  
 
(AP Courses)ti = π0i + π1i (Pre TxSlope)ti + π2i (TxLevel)ti + π3i(Post TxSlope)ti + eti 
π0i = β00 + β01(TxGroup) + r0i  
π1i = β10 + β11(TxGroup) + r1i 
π2i = β20 + β21(TxGroup) + r2i  
π3i = β30 + β31(TxGroup) + r3i (2) 
 
Finally, we estimated a covariate-adjusted CITS model to control for changes in school 
demographics across time. Controlling for school demographics allowed us to probe the alternative 
theory that shifts in school demographics—not the introduction of the AAC indicator—could 
explain any observed changes in AP course offerings. To probe this internal validity threat, we added 
four time-varying covariates to Level 1 in the piecewise hierarchical growth model: poverty, 
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racial/ethnic composition, enrollment, and student-teacher ratio. We excluded geographic locale 
since this variable is stable across time and therefore could not be responsible for changes in AP 
course offerings from the pre- to post-policy intervention period. We used R’s lme4 package to 
analyze all three models (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
Results 
 We begin this section by reporting the statistically significant differences between policy 
sensitive and nonsensitive schools found on most demographic variables. Next, we present 
hierarchical piecewise growth modeling analyses regarding the effects of Pennsylvania’s AAC 
indicator. Our ITS analyses determined whether the introduction of the AAC indicator was 
associated with statistically significant changes in the intercept and post-policy slope. We found 
Pennsylvania’s school accountability reforms resulted in an initial—but not sustained—increase in 
AP course offerings across all schools. Additionally, policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools did 
not appear to react differentially to the introduction of the AAC indicator: both school types initially 
increased AP course offerings and then returned to their respective pre-policy intervention 
trajectories. Importantly, these results showed that sizeable gaps between policy sensitive and 
nonsensitive schools—schools with the most and fewest AP course offerings—did not narrow, and 
instead appeared to widen across time. Finally, we found that controlling for changes in school 
demographics did not alter the direction or statistical significance of the policy intervention effect.  
Demographic Differences between Policy Sensitive and Nonsensitive Schools 
 In Table 2, we present the demographic differences between policy sensitive and 
nonsensitive schools. In 2013-14—the last pre-policy intervention year—the 162 policy sensitive 
schools offered an average of 2.42 AP courses, 7.81 fewer than the average among the 393 policy 
nonsensitive schools. On average, policy nonsensitive schools enrolled fewer students from 
socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds and more White students. Enrollment among policy 
nonsensitive schools was nearly double that of policy sensitive schools. Group differences regarding 
mean student-teacher ratios were not statistically significant. In terms of geographic locale, policy 
sensitive schools had more schools located in cities as well as in distant and remote locales. By 
contrast, policy nonsensitive schools had more schools in suburbs. Finally, both groups had nearly 
the same proportion of schools located in fringe areas.  
 
Table 2 
Empirical Contrasts of Policy Sensitive (n = 162) and Nonsensitive (n = 393) Schools 
t tests (df) Treatment group M SD t 95% CI 
AP courses (553) Sensitive 2.42 3.01 14.30* 6.74, 8.88 Nonsensitive 10.23 6.67 
      
Poverty (553) Sensitive 0.52 0.23 -9.27* -0.21, -0.14 Nonsensitive 0.34 0.19 
      
White (553) Sensitive 0.70 0.38 4.60* 0.07, 0.17 Nonsensitive 0.82 0.22 
      
Enroll (553) Sensitive 515.16 268.08 10.45* 404.85, 592.32 Nonsensitive 1013.74 582.25 
      
Ratio (552) Sensitive 14.63 4.00 0.25 -0.48, 0.61 Nonsensitive 14.70 2.41 
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Table 2 cont. 
Empirical Contrasts of Policy Sensitive (n = 162) and Nonsensitive (n = 393) Schools 
c2 tests (df) Treatment group Proportion c2  
City (1) Sensitive 0.27 26.20*  Nonsensitive 0.10  
     
Suburb (1) Sensitive 0.17 53.53*  Nonsensitive 0.51  
     
Fringe (1) Sensitive 0.21 0.03  Nonsensitive 0.20  
     
Distant (1) Sensitive 0.27 6.91*  Nonsensitive 0.17  
     
Remote (1) Sensitive 0.09 11.65*  Nonsensitive 0.02  
Note. *p < .05; Bonferroni’s correction accounts for Type I error; Data are from academic year 2013-14; df = degrees 
of freedom; M = mean, SD = standard deviation; t = t-statistic; CI = confidence interval  
 
Policy Intervention and Treatment Effects 
 In Table 3, we present findings for the simple ITS, CITS, and covariate-adjusted CITS 
models. In the simple ITS, both Pre TxSlope (β10) and TxLevel (β20) terms were statistically 
significant, p < .05. On average, school-level AP course offerings (Pre TxSlope) increased by 0.21 
courses per year prior to the AP policy intervention. The TxLevel finding suggests that 
Pennsylvania’s AAC policy intervention led to an initial average change of 0.34 AP course offerings 
per school. However, the Post TxSlope intervention variable (β30) was not statistically significant, p > 
.05. In sum, aside from the immediate increase in the number of AP courses, growth trajectories in 
AP course offerings did not change from the pre- to the post-policy intervention period, on average.  
In the CITS model, the estimate associated with the treatment group variable (β01) shows 
that during the first year of the study period (i.e., academic year 2007-08), policy sensitive schools 
offered 6.67 fewer AP courses than policy nonsensitive schools, p < .05. In addition, the interaction 
between the treatment group variable and the linear growth term (β11) revealed the slope for policy 
sensitive schools was statistically different than for policy nonsensitive schools across the baseline 
period, p < .05. The slope for TxGroup suggests policy nonsensitive schools increased AP course 
offerings at a rate of 0.20 more courses per year than policy sensitive schools prior to the AP policy 
change. That is, the gap between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools widened from academic 
years 2007-08 to 2014-15. However, neither interaction between the treatment group and the two 
post-policy time function variables (β21 and β31) resulted in statistically significant findings, p > .05. In 
other words, there was no statistical difference in how policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools 
reacted to the introduction of the AAC indicator. Both school groups initially increased AP course 
offerings after introduction of the AAC indicator and then returned to their respective pre-policy 
intervention growth trajectories.  
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Table 3    
Results for the Simple ITS, CITS, and Covariate-Adjusted CITS Hierarchical Piecewise Growth Models  
 Simple ITS CITS Covariate-Adjusted 
CITS 
Intercept (β00) 6.71 (0.26)* 8.65 (0.27)* 4.44 (0.47)* 
Level 1    
     aPre TxSlope (β10)                               0.21 (0.02)* 0.27 (0.03)* 0.34 (0.03)* 
     aTxLevel (β20) 0.34 (0.10)* 0.31 (0.12)* 0.29 (0.12)* 
     aPost TxSlope (β30)                           0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) 
     aEnroll (β40)                             0.44 (0.03)* 
     White (β50)                             -0.87 (0.41)* 
     aPoverty (β60)                             -0.98 (0.26)* 
     Ratio (β70)                             -0.00 (0.00) 
Level 2    
    TxGroup (β01)                          -6.67 (0.50)* -3.64 (0.34)* 
    TxGroup*Pre TxSlope (β11)                               -0.20 (0.05)* -0.22 (0.05)* 
    TxGroup*TxLevel (β21)  0.09 (0.22) 0.14 (0.22) 
    TxGroup*Post TxSlope (β31)                                                        0.01 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 
Note. *p < .05; a random effects; standard error in parentheses; For Enroll, as enrollment increases by 100 students AP 
subject offerings increases by .43 subjects 
 
Covariate-Adjusted CITS 
We added poverty, racial/ethnic composition, enrollment, and student-teacher ratio as time-
varying Level-1 covariates in the covariate-adjusted CITS model. Inclusion of the time-varying 
covariates allowed us to determine if shifts in school demographics were responsible for the initial 
increase in AP course offerings observed in the CITS model. The last column of Table 3 presents 
results for the covariate-adjusted CITS. Although smaller schools, higher poverty schools and those 
with a higher percentage of White students had relatively lower AP course offerings, the statistical 
significance and direction of AP incentive effects did not change with the addition of the time-
varying demographic covariates. That is, the covariate-adjusted CITS still revealed that the 
introduction of the AAC indicator resulted in an initial but not sustained increase in AP course 
offerings across all schools, with no significant difference between policy sensitive and nonsensitive 
schools. Figure 1 below presents the central findings from this study using the CITS model since the 
actual data and model results correspond so closely.  
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Figure 1. AP course offerings as functions of time and school group in the CITS model 
 
In Figure 1, the initial disparity in AP course offerings, the differential pre-policy growth 
trajectories between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools, and the initial increase in AP courses 
for both school groups coincident with the AP policy intervention can clearly be seen. The disparity 
in initial AP course offerings is represented by the large gap between policy sensitive and 
nonsensitive schools in academic year 2007-08. The differential AP growth trajectories are marked 
by the widening gap between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools across time. Finally, the 
statistically significant TxLevel finding is evident in the noticeable shift in average AP course 
offerings for both school groups from 2013-14 (the academic year before Pennsylvania introduced 
the AAC indicator) to 2014-15 (the first policy intervention year).  
Discussion 
 Despite increased public interest in AP and state-level policies designed to improve access 
(Education Commission of the States, 2016), research on the effects of those policies is relatively 
rare. Our study explored the effect of using accountability, not resource, incentives to improve 
school-level AP access. We focused on Pennsylvania’s accountability reforms to examine if including 
an AAC indicator improved school-level AP access. Because Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator resulted 
in two distinct school groups (policy sensitive and nonsensitive), our analyses enabled tests of 
whether the AAC indicator affected school groups differentially and if the two school groups 
differed demographically. Our aim was to analyze whether Pennsylvania’s school accountability 
incentive had the intended effect of improving AP access.  
Key Findings 
 Pennsylvania’s inclusion of an AAC indicator in its accountability system led to an initial 
increase in AP course offerings, on average. The increase was short-lived, however, as the AAC 
indicator failed to alter long-term growth in school-level AP course offerings across schools. Stated 
differently, we found no evidence that the AAC indicator changed the rate at which schools 
increased or decreased AP course offerings relative to the baseline period. Our results also suggest 
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the AAC indicator influenced policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools similarly: both school groups 
increased AP course offerings immediately after the policy intervention, but then returned to pre-
policy intervention trajectories. Moreover, the covariate-adjusted CITS showed the statistical 
significance and direction of these policy intervention effects did not change when we controlled for 
changes in school demographics across time. 
 Although we found no differences in how the two school groups reacted to the AAC 
indicator, our results revealed that an already sizeable gap in AP course offerings between policy 
sensitive and nonsensitive schools widened from 6.65 to 8.36 between academic years 2007-08 and 
2016-17 (see Figure 1). This finding suggests that Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator did not disrupt 
access inequalities between schools with the fewest and the most AP course offerings, supporting 
Klugman’s (2013) analysis of three California policies meant to improve AP access. That is, the 
present study provides additional evidence for the theory of Effectively Maintained Inequalities, 
which asserts that privileged schools will pursue status enhancements associated with expansive AP 
course offerings to maintain comparative advantages over less privileged schools, often widening 
opportunity gaps. Klugman’s study focused on a collection of resource-based policies; the present 
study showed similar findings when a state’s accountability system relies on public pressure rather 
than resource investment.  
Though not the primary objective of this study, our analyses revealed demographic 
differences between policy sensitive and nonsensitive schools. Those differences point to factors 
that associate with AP access inequalities and, therefore, might help formulate state and local 
policies that can leverage effective and equitable change. To that end, our comparisons of school 
groups in Pennsylvania echoed findings about unequal opportunities in California, Florida, Ohio, 
and various other regions of the U.S. (Cucchiara & Horvat, 2014; Demareth, 2009; Klugman, 2013; 
Oakes, Wells, Jones, & Datnow, 1997; Perna et al., 2015; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). Policy sensitive 
schools in Pennsylvania featured higher concentrations of students from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged backgrounds and students of color, highlighting troubling opportunity gaps that seem 
to be conditioned on socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity.  
 In addition to the aforementioned demographic differences, policy sensitive schools had 
smaller enrollments, supporting the notion that schools’ abilities to exploit economies of scale also 
seems to matter for AP access. Perhaps reflecting a link between geographic locale and enrollment, 
policy sensitive schools were also more urban and more remote than policy nonsensitive schools. 
Accordingly, suburban schools seem better positioned to provide AP access, thus perpetuating 
inequalities elsewhere (see Rury & Saatcioglu, 2011). The geographic locale findings are also 
pertinent to Klugman’s (2013) warning about the dangers of “potentially neglecting important 
dimensions of inequality” (p. 8). He referenced optimal ways to account for student- and school-
level poverty indicators. Extending his argument to focus on nuances in geographic locale, another 
potential source of inequality, we remind other researchers about the importance of accounting for 
geography’s complexity (Thier et al., 2017). Students living further away from cities (i.e., distant or 
remote) were most likely clustered into policy sensitive schools, where AP opportunities were most 
limited. Students in suburbs or fringes of those suburbs—which seem to be distinctions without any 
difference (Greenough & Nelson, 2015)—enjoyed greater AP access than peers in the innermost 
urban and outermost rural areas. 
Policy Implications 
Since the 1990s, school accountability has arguably been the most visible state policy 
approach for improving public schools (Shepard, 2008). The theory of change supporting school 
accountability incentives is that public reporting of school data will generate public pressure that 
causes teachers and administrators to change their behaviors leading to improved school 
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performance (Bae, 2018; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Hess, 2002; Lee & Reeves, 2012). Some scholars 
describe this theory of change as “fatally simple” (Lee & Reeves, 2012, p. 210), while others argue 
high stakes school accountability systems can have “transformative” effects on students and 
educators through “the coercive force of self-interest” (Hess, 2002, p. 70). Neither argument fits 
neatly with our results, which show Pennsylvania’s school accountability incentive resulted in an 
initial, but not sustained increase in AP course offerings. That is, Pennsylvania’s decision to publicly 
report AP access data within an accountability framework had neither simple nor transformative 
effects, and was not a long-term solution for improving AP access across all schools or narrowing 
disparities in access between schools.  
Two strands of principal-agent theory produce a possible explanation for the short-term 
gains achieved by Pennsylvania schools, but the lack of long-term, sustained increases in AP access. 
First, principal-agent theory maintains the strength of incentives can dictate the type of 
improvement efforts individuals or organizations pursue (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). For example, 
research shows accountability systems that institute severe sanctions for poor performance 
incentivize schools to pursue short-term gains instead of investing in long-term solutions (Figlio & 
Loeb, 2011). Importantly, the severity of consequences attached to accountability indicators varies 
widely both within and between states (Polikoff et al., 2014). At the most severe end of the 
spectrum, some states use the information generated from individual accountability indicators both 
in the calculation of school quality ratings and to identify low-performing schools that will receive 
state mandated interventions. States with the weakest incentives simply report school performance 
data, but do not use these data in school quality rating calculations or to identify schools in need of 
improvement. In general, Pennsylvania’s AP accountability incentive falls in the middle of this 
spectrum since the AAC indicator is used to calculate school quality ratings but not to identify 
schools in need of improvement (Polikoff et al., 2014). However, the strength of the incentive was 
weaker for policy sensitive schools since these schools, which maxed out on AAC points, could not 
earn more accountability points from increasing AP course offerings. Regardless, one possible 
explanation for the short-term increase in AP course access is that the strength of the incentive 
created by Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator resulted in all schools improving AP access in the short-
term above and beyond what the pre-policy intervention growth trend projected. 
Second, lacking the necessary capacity to change or having inadequate resources to do so are 
possible explanations for a lack of long-term positive outcomes stemming from school 
accountability incentives (Figlio & Ladd, 2015). Stated differently, schools simply may not have had 
the capacity or resources to sustain significant increases in AP course offerings. From a capacity 
perspective, several researchers suggest the challenge of identifying a sufficient number of students 
with high prior achievement is a barrier that may prevent educators from creating or demanding new 
AP courses for interested students (e.g., Iatarola et al., 2011; Kolluri, 2018; Rowland & Shircliffe, 
2016). Referring to this situation as “gatekeeping,” Rowland & Shircliffe (2016) highlight the fears of 
some educators that students with low levels of prior achievement will not benefit from AP 
participation, while also potentially interfering with experiences of more able students who sought 
early opportunities to learn college-level content and potentially earn college credit. 
Having a critical mass of students with high prior achievement to demand AP is just one 
resource-based explanation for why large schools can offer AP courses more readily than small 
schools. Another large school advantage includes the likelihood of having more teachers with 
advanced degrees and simply having more teachers in general (Iatarola et al., 2011). Challenges of 
recruiting and retaining highly qualified teachers also differentially disadvantage high-poverty schools 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, & Wheeler, 2007; Simon & Johnson, 2015) and schools in rural areas 
(Azano & Stewart, 2015). Policy sensitive schools in our sample were partly defined by being both 
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high-poverty and in remote areas. This may be one reason the gap between these schools and policy 
nonsensitive schools widened across time.  
Relying on only capacity limitations or resource inadequacy to explain disparities in school-
level AP access, however, does not pay sufficient attention to the structural, social, and political 
barriers that prevent equal access to advanced coursework to students in schools serving high 
proportions of students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds or students of color 
(e.g., academic tracking based on race/ethnicity or class; see Oakes, 1985; 2005). Reflecting on 30 
years of research on academic tracking, Oakes (2018) maintains that community fears attached to 
racial integration, a belief in a fixed intelligence for individuals, and the “politics of comparative 
advantage” has thwarted the effectiveness and sustainability of most detracking policies and 
programs (p. 96). In other words, structural, social, and political barriers may be just as important to 
explaining between-school disparities in AP access as the constraints that resource deprivation and 
geography present. Notably, the theory of change implicit in Pennsylvania’s accountability system 
design does not directly address the potential root causes to AP access disparities associated with 
capacity limitations, resource inadequacy, or the barriers posed by academic tracking.  
Taken together, these two strands of principal-agent theory suggest schools reacted to the 
moderate severity of the consequences attached to the AAC indicator by pursuing short-term gains. 
However, schools either lacked the capacity, had inadequate resources, or confronted other barriers 
that prevented the sustainability of those gains. Therefore, it appears comprehensive AP 
accountability polices should pay sufficient attention to the strength of the incentives produced by 
the design of individual indicators as well as invest in building the capacity of schools to increase AP 
access, address resource inadequacy, and challenge the harmful norms that perpetuate academic 
tracking based on student demographics.  
Limitations 
This study asked whether the introduction of Pennsylvania’s AP accountability incentive 
significantly changed school-level AP access immediately and across time. Our results suggest the 
initial answer to that question is yes in the short-term but no in the long-term. We acknowledge, 
however, that our conclusion rests on evidence from one state. Variation among state approaches to 
AP accountability incentives involve several types of indicators, weights placed on those indicators, 
and potential overlaps with other incentive policies and programs. Further studies that employ 
quasi-experimental designs or rigorous alternatives are needed to examine the effects of other state 
AP accountability incentives.  
Moreover, conducting ITS designs require researchers’ attentiveness to internal and external 
validity threats (see Hallberg, Williams, Swanlund, & Eno, 2018; Shadish et al., 2002; Wong, Cook, & 
Steiner, 2015). The internal threat of history centers on whether separate, alternative occurrences—
explicit policies or external events—could explain the presence or absence of intervention effects. 
To represent a true threat to validity, separate, alternative occurrences must be coincident with the 
onset of policy intervention. For example, although Pennsylvania features few state AP policies in 
comparison to other states, expanding AP access is one of 12 approved purposes for which school 
districts can use funds from the state’s Ready to Learn block grant program. In academic year 2014-
15, the Ready to Learn program replaced the Accountability Block Grant program, which began in 
2004-05. In addition to renaming the program, the state increased Ready to Learn funding by $100 
million in 2014-15, the year after Pennsylvania launched the School Performance Profile. Ready to Learn 
funding also increased from $200 million in 2014-15 to $250 million in 2016-17. Since changes to 
the Ready to Learn program occurred after Pennsylvania introduced the School Performance Profile, this 
potential threat to our findings was in relation to the post-policy intervention slope, for which we 
found no statistically significant association.  
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 Readers of the present study should, however, cautiously interpret the findings from this 
study because of two external validity threats: interactions of the casual relations with treatment 
variations and settings (see Shadish et al., 2002). First, because AP accountability incentives can 
manifest in many ways, these findings are not generalizable to all AP accountability incentives. For 
instance, Pennsylvania’s AAC indicator also included International Baccalaureate and other college 
credit-bearing coursework, potentially weakening the power of the AP accountability incentive, 
particularly for schools with robust International Baccalaureate or similar programs that provide 
access to college-level coursework. Though in Pennsylvania, AP far outweighs International 
Baccalaureate programming as only 16 public schools offer the International Baccalaureate Diploma 
Programme, designed for high school aged students (International Baccalaureate Organization, 
2018). Second, findings from this study are limited to only traditional high schools in Pennsylvania 
that were rated on the School Performance Profile. Findings may vary when examining different types of 
schools in different states that operate under different types of accountability systems. As the 
Education Commission of the States 2016 report shows, the design of AP accountability incentives 
varies considerably across states. 
Conclusion 
 Writing 15 years ago, Klopfenstein (2004) noted that “[i]ncreasing amounts of money are 
being invested, privately and at all levels of government, to expand the AP Program nationwide, but 
there has been little detailed research regarding the effect of this money on the access and 
participation of traditionally underserved students” (p. 10). Unfortunately, not much has changed. 
We still know very little about what policies will effectively expand AP access in schools, especially if 
those schools predominantly serve students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds 
and/or students of color, if those schools are small, or if those schools reside outside suburbs. 
Furthermore, as Kolluri’s (2018) literature review demonstrates, disparities in AP access between 
schools remain despite several federal and state policy initiatives.  
  As long as some students have their pathways impeded from the trajectory-altering 
opportunity of college-level coursework during high school (Adelman, 1999; 2006; Engberg & 
Wolniak, 2010), state educational systems will have to confront associated problems such as 
inequitable college admissions, on-time graduation, and earned income. For example, one benefit of 
AP courses is the possibility that a student could score high enough on end-of-course exams to 
bypass some college prerequisite courses. The resulting flexibility in collegiate scheduling could 
facilitate early or on-time graduation in an era when only about 60% of full-time degree-seeking 
students earn degrees within six years (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). 
Consequently, one should not just consider additional tuition fees associated with expenditures 
beyond the four-year proposition that most incoming college students expect. One should also 
factor opportunity costs of lost income when completing four-year degrees takes, on average, 50% 
longer than most might have planned for. To alleviate those concerns, we call for examinations in 
other states to determine if, and under what conditions, AP accountability incentives narrow access 
disparities. In the absence of such research, state policymakers will continue creating school 
accountability incentives with little idea of what actually works. 
References 
Achieve, & Jobs for the Future. (2015). Integrating earning college credit in high school into accountability 
systems. Washington, DC & Boston, MA: Author.  
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 138 21 
Ackerman, P. L., Kanfer, R., & Calderwood, C. (2013). High school Advanced Placement and 
student performance in college: STEM majors, non-stem majors, and gender differences. 
Teachers College Record, 115(10), 1–43. 
Adelman, C. (1999). Answers in the tool box: Academic intensity, attendance patterns, and bachelor's degree 
attainment. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.  
Adelman, C. (2006). The toolbox revisited: Paths to degree completion from high school through college. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.  
Azano, A. P., & Stewart, T. T. (2015). Exploring place and practicing justice: Preparing pre-service 
teachers for success in rural schools. Journal of Research in Rural Education, 30(9), 1–12. 
Bae, S. (2018). Redesigning systems of school accountability: A multiple measures approach to 
accountability and support. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 26(8), 1–32. 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.26.2920 
Barnard-Brak, L., McGaha-Garnett, V., & Burley, H. (2011). Advanced Placement course enrollment 
and school-level characteristics. NASSP Bulletin, 95, 165–174. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192636511418640 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2014). lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using Eigen and 
S4 (R package version 1.1-7) [Computer software]. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Berliner, D. (2011). Rational responses to high stakes testing: The case of curriculum narrowing and 
the harm that follows. Cambridge Journal of Education, 41, 287–302. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2011.607151 
Cisneros, J., Gomez, L. M., Powers, J. M., Holloway-Libell, J., & Corley, K. M. (2014). The 
Advanced Placement opportunity gap in Arizona: Access, participation, and success. AASA 
Journal of Scholarship & Practice, 11, 20–33. 
Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., Vigdor, J., & Wheeler, J. (2007). High-poverty schools and the distribution of 
teachers and principals. Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina Law Review, University of North 
Carolina. https://doi.org/10.1037/e722752011-001 
College Board. (1997). 1997 Advanced Placement program national summary reports. Retrieved from 
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/national_1997.pdf 
College Board. (2014). The 10th annual AP report to the nation. Author: New York, NY. Retrieved from 
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/ap/rtn/10th-annual/10th-annual-ap-
report-to-the-nation-single-page.pdf  
College Board. (2016). National Report. Retrieved from 
https://research.collegeboard.org/programs/ap/data/archived/ap-2016 
College Board. (2017). National Report. Retrieved from 
https://research.collegeboard.org/programs/ap/data/archived/ap-2017  
College Board. (2018). AP® Program Guide 2018-19. Retrieved from 
https://apcentral.collegeboard.org/pdf/ap-program-guide-2018-19.pdf 
Conger, D., Long, M. C., & Iatarola, P. (2009). Explaining race, poverty, and gender disparities in 
advanced course-taking. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28, 555–576. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20455 
Conley, D. T., Thier, M., Beach, P., Lench, S. C., & Chadwick, K. L. (2014). Measures for a college and 
career indicator: Advanced coursework. Eugene, OR: Educational Policy Improvement Center. 
Cucchiara, M. B., & Horvat, E. M. (2014). Choosing selves: The salience of parental identity in the 
school choice process. Journal of Education Policy, 29, 486–509. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2013.849760 
Darity, Jr., W., Castellino, D., Tyson, K., Cobb, C., & McMillen, B. (2001). Increasing opportunity to 
learn via access to rigorous courses and programs: One strategy for closing the achievement gap for at-risk and 
School Accountability Incentives and Advanced Placement Access 22 
ethnic minority students. Raleigh, NC: Division of Accountability, North Carolina State 
Department of Public Instruction. 
Darling-Hammond, L., Wilhoit, G., & Pittenger, L. (2014). Accountability for college and career 
readiness: Developing a new paradigm. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 22(86), 1–37. 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v22n86.2014 
Demareth, P. (2009). Producing success: The culture of personal advancement in an American high school. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226142425.001.0001 
Education Commission of the States. (2006). Advanced Placement policies: All state profiles. Retrieved 
from http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/MBQuestRT?Rep=AP03 
Education Commission of the States. (2016). Advanced Placement policies: All state profiles. Retrieved 
from http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbprofallrt?Rep=APA16 
Education Trust. (2019). Advanced coursework: An overview. Washington, DC: Author.  
Engberg, M. E., & Wolniak, G. C. (2010). Examining the effects of high school contexts on 
postsecondary enrollment. Research in Higher Education, 51, 132–153. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-009-9150-y 
Figlio, D., & Ladd, H. F. (2015). School accountability and student achievement. In H. F. Ladd & M. 
Goertz (Eds.), Handbook of research in education finance and policy (2nd ed., pp. 194–210). New 
York: Routledge.  
Figlio, D., & Loeb, S. (2011). School accountability. In E. Hanushek, S. Machin, & L. Woessmann 
(Eds.), Handbook of the economics of education (Vol. 3, pp. 383–421). North Holland, The 
Netherlands: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53429-3.00008-9 
Gagnon, D. J., & Mattingly, M. J. (2016). Advanced Placement and rural schools: Access, success, 
and exploring alternatives. Journal of Advanced Academics, 27, 266–284. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1932202X16656390 
Geiser, S., & Santelices, V. (2004). The role of Advanced Placement and honors courses in college admissions. 
Berkeley, CA: Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California Berkeley. 
Greenough, R., & Nelson, S. R. (2015). Recognizing the variety of rural schools. Peabody Journal of 
Education, 90, 322–332. https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2015.1022393 
Hallberg, K., Williams, R., Swanlund, A., & Eno, J. (2018). Short comparative interrupted time series 
using aggregate school-level data in education research. Educational Researcher, 47, 295–306. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X18769302 
Hess, F. M. (2002). Reform, resistance... retreat? The predictable politics of accountability in 
Virginia. In D. Ravitch (Ed.), Brookings Papers on Educational Policy: 2002 (pp. 69-122). 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. https://doi.org/10.1353/pep.2002.0007 
Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. R. (1986). Managerial incentives and capital management. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 101, 835–860. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884180 
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset 
ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7, 24–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 
Iatarola, P., Conger, D., & Long, M. C. (2011). Determinants of high schools’ advanced course 
offerings. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 33, 340–359. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373711398124 
International Baccalaureate Organization. (2018). Find an IB World School. Retrieved from 
https://www.ibo.org/programmes/find-an-ib-school/ 
Jackson, C. K. (2010). A little now for a lot later: A look at a Texas Advanced Placement Incentive 
Program. Journal of Human Resources, 45, 591–639. https://doi.org/10.1353/jhr.2010.0019 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. C. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 138 23 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
Jeong, D. W. (2009). Student participation and performance on Advanced Placement exams: Do 
state-sponsored incentives make a difference? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 31, 
346–366. https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373709342466 
Kramer, D. (2016). Examining the impact of state level merit-aid policies on Advanced Placement 
participation. Journal of Education Finance, 41, 322–343. https://doi.org/10.1353/jef.2016.0000 
Klopfenstein, K. (2004). The Advanced Placement expansion of the 1990s: How did traditionally 
underserved students fare? Education Policy Analysis Archives, 12(68), 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v12n68.2004 
Klugman, J. (2013). The Advanced Placement arms race and the reproduction of educational 
inequality. Teachers College Record, 115(5), 1–34.  
Kolluri, S. (2018). Advanced Placement: The dual challenge of equal access and effectiveness. Review 
of Educational Research, 88, 671–711. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654318787268 
Lacy, T. (2010). Access, rigor, and revenue in the history of the Advanced Placement program. In P. 
Sadler, G. Sonnert, R. Tai, & K. Klopfenstein (Eds.), A critical examination of the Advanced 
Placement program (pp. 17–50). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. 
Lee, J., & Reeves, T. (2012). Revisiting the impact of NCLB high-stakes school accountability, 
capacity, and resources: State NAEP 1990–2009 reading and math achievement gaps and 
trends. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 34, 209–231. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373711431604 
Lucas, S. (2001). Effectively maintained inequality: Education transitions, track mobility, and social 
background effects. American Journal of Sociology, 106, 1642–1690. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/321300 
Malkus, N. (2015). AP at scale: Public school students in Advanced Placement, 1990-2013. Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute. 
Malkus, N. (2016). The AP peak: Public school offerings Advanced Placement, 2000-2012. Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute. 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1988). An economic approach to influence activities in organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology, 94, S154-S179. https://doi.org/10.1086/228945 
Moe, T. M. (2003). The politics and practice of accountability. In P. E. Peterson & M. R. West 
(Eds.), No Child Left Behind? The politics and practice of school accountability. Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press.  
Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 739–
777. https://doi.org/10.2307/2110997 
Morse, R., & Brooks, E. (2019). How U.S. News calculated the 2019 Best High School ranking. U.S. 
News & World Report. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-
schools/articles/how-us-news-calculated-the-rankings 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2017). Graduation rate from first institution attended for 
first-time, full-time bachelor's degree-seeking students at 4-year postsecondary institutions, 
by race/ethnicity, time to completion, sex, control of institution, and acceptance rate: 
Selected cohort entry years, 1996 through 2010. Retrieved from 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_326.10.asp?current=yes 
Oakes, J. (1985). Keeping track. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Oakes, J. (2005). Keeping track (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University.  
Oakes, J. (2018). 2016 AERA presidential address: Public scholarship: Education research for a 
diverse democracy. Educational Researcher, 47, 91–104. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X17746402 
School Accountability Incentives and Advanced Placement Access 24 
Oakes, J., Wells, A. S., Jones, M., & Datnow, A. (1997). Detracking: The social construction of 
ability, cultural politics, and resistance to reform, Teachers College Record, 98, 482–510.  
Owens, A., Reardon, S., & Jencks, C. (2016). Income segregation between schools and school 
districts. American Educational Research Journal, 53, 1159–1197. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831216652722 
Perna, L. W., May, H., Yee, A., Ransom, T., Rodriguez, A., & Fester, R. (2015). Unequal access to 
rigorous high school curricula: An exploration of the opportunity to benefit from the 
International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme. Educational Policy, 29, 402–425. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904813492383 
Polikoff, M. S., McEachin, A. J., Wrabel, S. L., & Duque, M. (2014). The waive of the future? School 
accountability in the waiver era. Educational Researcher, 43, 45–54. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X13517137 
Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Rothstein, R., Jacobsen, R., & Wilder, T. (2008). Grading education: Getting accountability right. 
Washington, DC and New York: Economic Policy Institute and Teachers College Press. 
Rowland, M. L., & Shircliffe, B. J. (2016). Confronting the “acid test:” Educators’ perspectives on 
expanding access to Advanced Placement at a diverse Florida high school. Peabody Journal of 
Education, 91, 404–420. https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2016.1184947 
Rury, J. L., & Saatcioglu, A. (2011). Suburban advantage: Opportunity hoarding and secondary 
attainment in the postwar metropolitan North. American Journal of Education, 117, 307–342. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/659210 
Sadler, P. M. (2010). Advanced high school coursework and college admission decisions. In P. 
Sadler, G. Sonnert, R. Tai, & K. Klopfenstein (Eds.), A critical examination of the Advanced 
Placement program (pp. 245–261). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.  
Schneider, J. (2009). Privilege, equity, and the Advanced Placement program: Tug of war. Journal of 
Curriculum Studies, 41, 813–831. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220270802713613 
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for 
generalized causal inference. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage learning. 
Shepard, L. A. (2008). A brief history of accountability testing, 1965-2007. In K. E. Ryan, & L. A. 
Shepard (Eds.), The future of test-based educational accountability (pp. 25–46). New York: 
Routledge. 
Singer, J. D., & Willet, J. B. (2003). Applied longitudinal data analysis: Modeling change and event occurrence. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195152968.001.0001 
Simon, N. S., & Johnson, S. M. (2015). Teacher turnover in high-poverty schools: What we know 
and can do. Teachers College Record, 117(3), 1–36. 
Thier,, M., Beach, P., Martinez, C. R., & Hollenbeck, K. L. (2017, April). Take care when cutting: 
Unintended consequences of disaggregating school-level data as rural. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Education Research Association, San Antonio, TX.  
Thier, M., Beach, P., Todd, J., & Coleman, M. (2016). Places, poverty, and pupils: Exploring key 
predictors of Advanced Placement access. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Education Research Association, Washington, DC. 
U.S. Department of Education. (2013). Advanced Placement incentive program grants: Funding status. 
Retrieved from https://www2.ed.gov/programs/apincent/funding.html 
Warne, R. (2017). Research on the academic benefits of the Advanced Placement program: Taking 
stock and looking forward. SAGE Open, 7(1), 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016682996 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 138 25 
Wong, M., Cook, T. D., & Steiner, P. M. (2015). Adding design elements to improve time series  
designs: No Child Left Behind as an example of causal pattern-matching. Journal of Research on 
Educational Effectiveness, 8, 245-279. 
Zarate, M., & Pachon, H. (2006). Equity in offering advanced placement courses in California high schools. Los 
Angeles, CA: The Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. 
 
About the Authors 
 
Paul Beach 
University of Oregon  
ptb@uoregon.edu 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8121-2459 
Paul Beach is a PhD candidate in Quantitative Research Methods in Education at the University 
of Oregon and a Research Associate at Inflexion. His research focuses on analyzing the effects 
of state accountability policy and the factors that influence equitable school improvement.  
 
Keith Zvoch 
University of Oregon  
kzvoch@uoregon.edu 
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9348-5155 
Keith Zvoch is an Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Methodology, Policy 
and Leadership at the University of Oregon. His research focuses on causal inference in field-
based settings, the application and study of methodologies that account for breakdowns in 
treatment protocol, and the modeling of time series data.  
 
Michael Thier  
University of Oregon  
mthier@uoregon.edu 
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2851-6255 
Michael Thier is a PhD candidate in Educational Leadership at the University of Oregon. His 
research focuses on global citizenship education, including international/cross-cultural 
comparisons and the opportunities and conditions that enable global citizenship education in 
rural and remote settings. 
 
  
School Accountability Incentives and Advanced Placement Access 26 
education policy analysis archives 
Volume 27 Number 138  October 28, 2019 ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 Readers are free to copy, display, distribute, and adapt this article, as long as 
the work is attributed to the author(s) and Education Policy Analysis Archives, the changes 
are identified, and the same license applies to the derivative work. More details of this Creative 
Commons license are available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/. EPAA is 
published by the Mary Lou Fulton Institute and Graduate School of Education at Arizona State 
University Articles are indexed in CIRC (Clasificación Integrada de Revistas Científicas, Spain), 
DIALNET (Spain), Directory of Open Access Journals, EBSCO Education Research Complete, 
ERIC, Education Full Text (H.W. Wilson), QUALIS A1 (Brazil), SCImago Journal Rank, SCOPUS, 
SOCOLAR (China). 
Please send errata notes to Audrey Amrein-Beardsley at audrey.beardsley@asu.edu   
 
Join EPAA’s Facebook community at https://www.facebook.com/EPAAAAPE and Twitter 
feed @epaa_aape. 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 138 27 
education policy analysis archives 
editorial board  
Lead Editor: Audrey Amrein-Beardsley (Arizona State University) 
Editor Consultor: Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Associate Editors: Melanie Bertrand, David Carlson, Lauren Harris, Eugene Judson, Mirka Koro-Ljungberg, 
Daniel Liou, Scott Marley, Molly Ott, Iveta Silova (Arizona State University) 
 
Cristina Alfaro  
San Diego State University 
Amy Garrett Dikkers University 
of North Carolina, Wilmington 
Gloria M. Rodriguez 
University of California, Davis 
Gary Anderson  
New York University  
Gene V Glass   
Arizona State University 
R. Anthony Rolle  
University of Houston 
Michael W. Apple  
University of Wisconsin, Madison  
Ronald Glass  University of 
California, Santa Cruz 
A. G. Rud  
Washington State University
  
Jeff Bale  
University of Toronto, Canada 
Jacob P. K. Gross   
University of Louisville 
Patricia Sánchez University of 
University of Texas, San Antonio 
Aaron Bevanot SUNY Albany Eric M. Haas WestEd Janelle Scott  University of 
California, Berkeley  
David C. Berliner   
Arizona State University  
Julian Vasquez Heilig California 
State University, Sacramento 
Jack Schneider University of 
Massachusetts Lowell 
Henry Braun Boston College  Kimberly Kappler Hewitt 
University of North Carolina 
Greensboro 
Noah Sobe  Loyola University 
Casey Cobb   
University of Connecticut  
Aimee Howley  Ohio University Nelly P. Stromquist   
University of Maryland 
Arnold Danzig   
San Jose State University  
Steve Klees  University of Maryland 
Jaekyung Lee SUNY Buffalo  
Benjamin Superfine  
University of  Illinois, Chicago 
Linda Darling-Hammond  
Stanford University  
Jessica Nina Lester 
Indiana University 
Adai Tefera  
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Elizabeth H. DeBray  
University of Georgia 
Amanda E. Lewis  University of 
Illinois, Chicago      
A. Chris Torres 
Michigan State University 
David E. DeMatthews 
University of Texas at Austin 
Chad R. Lochmiller Indiana 
University 
Tina Trujillo     
University of California, Berkeley 
Chad d'Entremont  Rennie Center 
for Education Research & Policy 
Christopher Lubienski  Indiana 
University  
Federico R. Waitoller  
University of Illinois, Chicago 
John Diamond  
University of Wisconsin, Madison 
Sarah Lubienski  Indiana University Larisa Warhol  
University of Connecticut 
Matthew Di Carlo  
Albert Shanker Institute 
William J. Mathis  
University of Colorado, Boulder 
John Weathers University of  
Colorado, Colorado Springs 
Sherman Dorn 
Arizona State University 
Michele S. Moses  
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Kevin Welner  
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Michael J. Dumas  
University of California, Berkeley 
Julianne Moss   
Deakin University, Australia  
Terrence G. Wiley  
Center for Applied Linguistics 
Kathy Escamilla   
University ofColorado, Boulder 
Sharon Nichols   
University of Texas, San Antonio  
John Willinsky  
Stanford University  
Yariv Feniger Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev 
Eric Parsons  
University of Missouri-Columbia 
Jennifer R. Wolgemuth  
University of South Florida 
Melissa Lynn Freeman  
Adams State College 
Amanda U. Potterton 
University of Kentucky 
Kyo Yamashiro  
Claremont Graduate University 
Rachael Gabriel 
University of Connecticut 
Susan L. Robertson 
Bristol University 
Miri Yemini 
Tel Aviv University, Israel 
School Accountability Incentives and Advanced Placement Access 28 
archivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
consejo editorial 
Editor Consultor: Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editores Asociados: Felicitas Acosta (Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, Argentina), Armando Alcántara 
Santuario (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), Ignacio Barrenechea, Jason Beech (Universidad de San 
Andrés), Angelica Buendia, (Metropolitan Autonomous University), Alejandra Falabella (Universidad Alberto 
Hurtado, Chile), Veronica Gottau (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella), Antonio Luzon, (Universidad de Granada), José 
Luis Ramírez, (Universidad de Sonora), Paula Razquin, Axel Rivas (Universidad de San Andrés), Maria Veronica 
Santelices (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile), Maria Alejandra Tejada-Gómez (Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana, Colombia) 
 
Claudio Almonacid 
Universidad Metropolitana de 
Ciencias de la Educación, Chile 
Ana María García de Fanelli  
Centro de Estudios de Estado y 
Sociedad (CEDES) CONICET, 
Argentina 
Miriam Rodríguez Vargas 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Tamaulipas, México 
Miguel Ángel Arias Ortega 
Universidad Autónoma de la 
Ciudad de México 
Juan Carlos González Faraco 
Universidad de Huelva, España 
José Gregorio Rodríguez 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
Colombia 
Xavier Besalú Costa  
Universitat de Girona, España 
María Clemente Linuesa 
Universidad de Salamanca, España 
Mario Rueda Beltrán Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad 
y la Educación, UNAM, México 
Xavier Bonal Sarro Universidad 
Autónoma de Barcelona, España   
 
Jaume Martínez Bonafé 
 Universitat de València, España 
José Luis San Fabián Maroto  
Universidad de Oviedo,  
España 
 
Antonio Bolívar Boitia 
Universidad de Granada, España 
Alejandro Márquez Jiménez 
Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la 
Universidad y la Educación, 
UNAM, México 
Jurjo Torres Santomé, Universidad 
de la Coruña, España 
José Joaquín Brunner Universidad 
Diego Portales, Chile  
María Guadalupe Olivier Tellez, 
Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, 
México 
Yengny Marisol Silva Laya 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 
México 
Damián Canales Sánchez 
Instituto Nacional para la 
Evaluación de la Educación, 
México  
 
Miguel Pereyra Universidad de 
Granada, España 
Ernesto Treviño Ronzón 
Universidad Veracruzana, México 
Gabriela de la Cruz Flores 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México 
Mónica Pini Universidad Nacional 
de San Martín, Argentina 
Ernesto Treviño Villarreal 
Universidad Diego Portales 
Santiago, Chile 
Marco Antonio Delgado Fuentes 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 
México 
Omar Orlando Pulido Chaves 
Instituto para la Investigación 
Educativa y el Desarrollo 
Pedagógico (IDEP) 
Antoni Verger Planells 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, España 
Inés Dussel, DIE-CINVESTAV, 
México 
 
José Ignacio Rivas Flores 
Universidad de Málaga, España 
Catalina Wainerman  
Universidad de San Andrés, 
Argentina 
Pedro Flores Crespo Universidad 
Iberoamericana, México 
 Juan Carlos Yáñez Velazco 
Universidad de Colima, México 
 
   
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 27 No. 138 29 
  
arquivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
conselho editorial 
Editor Consultor:  Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editoras Associadas: Kaizo Iwakami Beltrao, (Brazilian School of Public and Private Management - EBAPE/FGV, 
Brazil), Geovana Mendonça Lunardi Mendes (Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina), Gilberto José Miranda, 
(Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Brazil), Marcia Pletsch, Sandra Regina Sales (Universidade Federal Rural do 
Rio de Janeiro) 
 
Almerindo Afonso 
Universidade do Minho  
Portugal 
 
Alexandre Fernandez Vaz  
Universidade Federal de Santa 
Catarina, Brasil 
José Augusto Pacheco 
Universidade do Minho, Portugal 
Rosanna Maria Barros Sá  
Universidade do Algarve 
Portugal 
 
Regina Célia Linhares Hostins 
Universidade do Vale do Itajaí, 
 Brasil 
Jane Paiva 
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Maria Helena Bonilla  
Universidade Federal da Bahia  
Brasil 
 
Alfredo Macedo Gomes  
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco 
Brasil 
Paulo Alberto Santos Vieira  
Universidade do Estado de Mato 
Grosso, Brasil 
Rosa Maria Bueno Fischer  
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul, Brasil 
 
Jefferson Mainardes  
Universidade Estadual de Ponta 
Grossa, Brasil 
Fabiany de Cássia Tavares Silva 
Universidade Federal do Mato 
Grosso do Sul, Brasil 
Alice Casimiro Lopes  
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Jader Janer Moreira Lopes  
Universidade Federal Fluminense e 
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, 
Brasil 
António Teodoro  
Universidade Lusófona 
Portugal 
Suzana Feldens Schwertner 
Centro Universitário Univates  
Brasil 
 
 Debora Nunes 
 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Norte, Brasil 
Lílian do Valle 
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Flávia Miller Naethe Motta 
Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
 
Alda Junqueira Marin 
 Pontifícia Universidade Católica de 
São Paulo, Brasil 
Alfredo Veiga-Neto 
 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul, Brasil 
 Dalila Andrade Oliveira 
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Brasil 
 
 
